Dani Caputi

Here I propose a unique approach to questions about subjectivity and the self that simplifies several long-standing puzzles about the persistence and individuality of minds. Definitions of the “self” vary widely, but most describe a narrative or identity we build over time. Critics argue that the idea of a fixed self carries questionable assumptions about the mind, such as the existence of a single, lifelong consciousness or a definitive personal identity. To avoid this conceptual baggage, I distinguish the narrative self from the subject of experience. More precisely, I refer to the subjective perspective of phenomenal consciousness (SPPC)—the basic first-person viewpoint from which all experience occurs (e.g. if there is an experience of pain, there must also be an SPPC for whom that pain is present). Consciousness in an ant, if present, is likely bound to an SPPC, even though it lacks anything like a human “self”. This general framework appears in the work of Strawson, Zahavi, Kriegel, and Turausky. Zahavi further proposes that if you had a perfect clone that shared identical memories and experiences, the clone would not be you. While an outside observer would not know which clone you are, the fact that you would care which body is yours if only one is about to be destroyed shows that subjectivity involves a further fact about which SPPC is instantiated, not merely what is experienced. This suggests that each SPPC is distinguishable from every other SPPC in a way that cannot be reduced to the experiential content associated with those SPPCs. Given these properties, I define "active subjects" as SPPCs currently instantiated in a working conscious system (a brain, or any consciousness-supporting substrate), and "potential subjects" as SPPCs that could exist if the right physical conditions arose. Potential subjects are the kind of metaphysical possibility Dawkins highlights when noting that the number of “potential people” vastly exceeds those who are ever born. A potential SPPC becomes an active SPPC only when nature happens to produce the physical conscious system that gives rise to that particular SPPC. This framework allows us to reframe a variety of classic paradoxes such as teletransportation, mind uploading, and Davidson's “Swampman” scenario as instances of the Selection Problem: when a new physical conscious system arises, why is it a particular potential SPPC (rather than another) that becomes active? This framework brings under a single question issues about qualitative versus numerical identity for minds, the combination problem in panpsychism, and debates about personal survival under duplication. The Selection Problem builds on Chalmers’ approach to the Hard Problem while incorporating the distinctions I draw between the self, the subject, and qualitative experience. The Hard Problem asks, “given the basic physical ingredients of the universe, what makes a system phenomenally conscious?”—a formulation that made questions about qualia scientifically approachable. I extend this line of inquiry to subjectivity: if a physical system is conscious, what makes it the perspective of this particular subject rather than any other possible subject of experience?

Dani Caputi is an atmospheric scientist and consciousness researcher whose work bridges environmental science with explorations into anomalous cognition and the philosophy of mind. Her academic background includes a Ph.D. in Atmospheric Science from the University of California, Davis (2020), where her dissertation examined the meteorological conditions driving high ozone events in California’s Central Valley. Dani has been a recurring guest on New Thinking Allowed, a YouTube channel with more than 200,000 subscribers, where she discusses topics at the intersection of scientific inquiry, consciousness, and human experience. Her achievements also include recognition as an XPRIZE Pandemic Response Challenge Finalist.