Mouhamad Diagne

Understanding how a physical stimulus becomes a conscious experience remains one of the fundamental problems of consciousness studies. Most existing approaches attempt to explain consciousness either through neural correlates or through informational and cognitive principles. The present framework adopts a different perspective by introducing a psychophysical formalism intended to describe the elementary mechanisms underlying perceptual consciousness itself. The central hypothesis is that consciousness is not a static state but a dynamic process composed of successive cycles of integration. At every instant, numerous environmental signals simultaneously affect the perceptual system. However, these signals do not all reach awareness in the same manner or with the same intensity. The model therefore proposes the existence of an integration mechanism responsible for generating instantaneous states of perceptual consciousness. In this work we have tried to understand the mechanisms of consciousness by means of a certain symbolic representation. It is from this that we arrive at the establishment of mathematical formulae on the dynamic psychophysical mechanisms of consciousness, which can allow an explanation and a mechanistic description of the basic phenomena linked to it, and leading specifically to the concept of the fundamental state of consciousness. Within this framework, consciousness appears as a dynamic consequence of attention when integration crosses a critical threshold governed by a fundamental constant — the golden ratio φ — interpreted here as an attentional constant. The model thus established is based on concepts developed through mathematical reasoning and a psycho-cognitive approach. Isn't it important to have a theory that goes beyond the strict framework of neuroscience in order to unify the various fields of study linked to consciousness, including philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence and neuroscience itself? In other words, shouldn't the starting point be abstract concepts, where empirical data can serve as evidence? And we can suspect probable neurophysiological correlations on the concepts which are elaborated there. However, by situating itself upstream of neurobiological descriptions, this hypothesis proposes a unifying abstract framework in which empirical data can serve as elements of validation rather than as the point of departure. Ultimately, it is more of an explanatory tool of consciousness, making it possible to devise a mechanistic basis for understanding human consciousness, and perhaps any other form of consciousness.

Mouhamad Diagne is an independant researcher in the mathematical modeling of consciousness, attention and perception. He holds a bachelor's degree in Computer Networks and has an academic background in automation. His current research focuses on developing a psychophysical formalism describing consciousness perceptual micro-states and their emergence through attentional dynamics mechanisms.