Rachid Orula

The extended cognition hypothesis (HEC) argues cognitive process can extend beyond the skull when organisms properly interact with tools for cognitive tasks. Proper interaction is determined by (1) the tool realizing an integral functional role in a cognitive operation, and (2) the organism and the tool are coupled in a causal two way interaction. HEC is supported by the Parity Principle, which claims environmental processes that would be counted as cognitive if it occurred inside the head, are genuinely part of the cognitive process. I argue the original formulation of HEC (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) lacks the resources to differentiate between genuine and apparent cases of cognitive unity. I demonstrate this with a modification of their Tetris example. The original text presents different ways of rotating objects as support for HEC. Firstly, a mental rotation only using the mind, then rotating virtual objects in a computer, and lastly using a brain chip. I introduce a variation of this example, focusing on the second scenario. In this variation, the mouse is disconnected and there’s a hidden operator coordinating the subjects hand movements with the screen. It is indistinguishable from a regular computer and the subject is unaware of any deception occurring. Accepting the hidden operator scenario as extended cognition allows for a functional asymmetry that weakens Parity, but rejecting it is not clear based on computational structure and coupling. Thus, a strong dilemma emerges for HEC that is not clearly solvable based on its premises and criteria. I conclude HEC needs a reformulation that accounts for these scenarios. I propose a new conceptual framework, “cognitive illusions,” as both an explanation of the phenomenon and a possible solution to the issue. I claim illusions of unity can occur when two independent processes can appear integrated through speed and coordination, analogous to optical illusions like thaumatropes. The hidden operator structurally resembles these illusions, operating similarly through coordination and speed. Therefore, the conceptual framework is a plausible candidate to explain the problematic of the case as well as an additional criterion for HEC.

I’m a graduate student in philosophy at Brandeis University. I have presented in both The Science of Consciousness conference as well as The Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness conference. I’ve also given a one hour educational talk in Spanish on consciousness and philosophy of AI. My research interests are in philosophy of mind, cognitive science and metaphysics.