Rebecca Peng

Cognitive science needs phenomenology, not despite, but because of the epistemic challenges posed by consciousness. This article argues that the pervasive presence of intuitive dualism, the empirical cognitive tendency to distinguish the mental from physical, is a widespread and entrenched feature of human experience. Drawing on work in developmental psychology and cognitive anthropology, we suggest that first‐person experience, often bracketed or marginalized in scientific accounts, must instead be treated as a legitimate source of epistemic access. The goal is in no way to return to metaphysical dualism but to recognize that the intuitively dualist subjective experience forms the data any science of consciousness must take seriously. Reframing the study of consciousness through phenomenological epistemology not only acknowledges the ontological stakes of mental phenomena but also realigns scientific inquiry with the lived realities it seeks to explain. This interdisciplinary rethinking offers a path forward for reconciling cognitive science, philosophy and the enduring puzzle of consciousness.

Rebecca Peng is a Ph.D. candidate in the History and Philosophy of Science and Medicine department at Indiana University Bloomington. Her research focuses on the philosophy of cognitive science, with particular emphasis on the epistemology of consciousness, phenomenological methods, AI consciousness, and interdisciplinary consilience. She has recently published work on the role of phenomenology in cognitive science. Rebecca has received the UChicago IFK MAPSS Thesis Award and has presented her work at the University of Chicago. Rebecca holds an M.A. in Social Sciences from the University of Chicago and a B.A. in Cognitive Science and Psychology from Vassar College. She also has teaching experience in psychology, history of science, philosophy of science, and bioethics.